Grazer Philosophische Studien, 45, 125-134 (1993).
While "A needs X" often calls for supplementation by the Y X is needed for, Thomson, Wiggins, and Braybrooke have argued that there is a sense of "need" for which this is unnecessary. But Gricean conventions for conversation allow us to use ellipsis in a unified account of "need" while explaining the data Thomson and Wiggins appeal to: non-detachment of bare needs from more fully specified ones, avoidance of serious harm as a default filling of the Y-slot, and the apparent normativeness of some need-statements. Their detailed discussions also undermine the utility of demarcating a sense of "fundamental" need.
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